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SUPERVISING ACROSS BORDERS:  
THE CASE OF MULTINATIONAL HIERARCHIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines how multinational corporations (MNCs) selectively assign supervisory 
responsibilities to units in countries with varying levels of institutional quality. Arbitraging across 
institutional contexts is an important function of MNCs, but it also creates coordination 
challenges. The choice of organization structure, such as the differential assignment of 
supervisory responsibilities, is an important tool for managing these coordination challenges. 
Using data on the business activities and supervision relationships within U.S. multinational 
manufacturers in 1996–2008, I find that frontline subsidiaries in countries with weaker 
institutions are more likely to be supervised by foreign rather than domestic supervisory units. 
Foreign supervision is even more likely when subsidiaries in weak-institution countries conduct 
activities that are more central to or interdependent with their parents’ global operations. These 
findings confirm that MNCs use differential supervision to enhance global coordination. The 
paper highlights one of the most unique features of MNCs: a multinational hierarchy that resides 
within firm’s boundary but across national borders. It also connects MNCs’ hierarchical structure 
with institutional imperfections that give rise to the emergence of the firm in the first place. 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Scholars in law, finance, development economics, and strategy have long argued that firm growth is 
undermined in countries with weak institutions, such as countries with insufficient transparency, 
inefficient judicial systems, and ambiguous property rights. This is largely because weak institutions 
increase domestic firms’ costs for sourcing inputs, distributing products, and mobilizing resources (North, 
1990). Interestingly, however, weak national institutions do not impose an equally binding constraint on 
multinational corporations (MNCs). In fact, MNCs often employ their unique organizational form to 
arbitrage between  varying institutional constraints and reallocate resources across national borders, 
effectively putting “sovereignty at bay” (Kobrin 2001, Vernon 1971, p.3). For example, MNCs can 
circumvent trade barriers through foreign direct investment and internal sourcing (Caves 1996), or 
leverage differences in tax regimes by redistributing operations and profits among host countries (Desai et 
al. 2004). They can also compensate for underdeveloped local financial markets with internal capital 
markets (Antràs et al. 2009), or mitigate appropriability risks in countries with weak intellectual property 
rights protection (IPR) by sourcing from their units in weak IPR countries innovations that are of greater 
value internally than to potential competitors (Zhao 2006). Although these arbitrage strategies provide a 
basis for competitive advantage of MNCs vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts, it also imposes 
coordination challenges. In this paper, I investigate the organization structures that MNCs employ to 
manage these coordination challenges.  
I direct the lens at an important but understudied structural choice available to MNCs: differential 
supervision, or employing local or foreign supervision for their overseas subsidiaries. I argue that 
differential supervision facilitates coordination of subsidiaries in host countries with varying levels of 
institutional quality. Institutions affect firm coordination in two important ways (North 1990). First, 
institutions shape the availability of complementary information, which affects joint decision-making. 
Second, through the prevailing rule of law and enforcement mechanisms, institutions affect the clarity of 
property rights and, consequently, the risk that assets valuable for joint tasks may be expropriated. In 
response, MNCs operating in weak-institution countries (WICs) can manage coordination challenges by 
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specifying internal channels of information flow and reallocating decision rights through an 
organizational hierarchy. Reducing the supervisory responsibilities of units in WICs and increasing the 
supervisory responsibilities of units in strong-institution countries allows an MNC to (1) integrate scarce 
local information with complementary regional and international data, and (2) reduce expropriation risks 
by limiting the exposure of corporate resources to a host country’s weak property rights.  
This is illustrated in Figure 1. This U.S. MNC operates in two foreign countries, A and B. If both 
countries have strong institutions, then each subsidiary in A and B is expected to report to supervisory 
units in its own country (SUA or SUB) to ensure fit with the local environment (represented by the solid 
lines of command) or to report to corporate headquarters or regional supervisory units, with A and B 
having equal probability to host regional supervisory units. However, if country A is a weak-institution 
country and country B is a strong-institution country, the MNC may “reallocate” supervisory 
responsibilities for some subsidiaries in country A (e.g., U3) to supervisory units in country B 
(represented by the dotted line of command). Moving supervision of U3 away from country A allows the 
MNC to engage U3 in global operations while mitigating its exposure to country A’s institutional risks, 
giving the MNC a unique competitive advantage relative to domestic firms operating in any single 
country. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In addition to institutional differences at the country level, this paper explores differences in the 
impact of institutions at the firm level. In particular, because coordination is more important when 
activities are interdependent, this paper examines the extent to which an MNC unit is engaged in tasks 
that are interdependent with its parent firm’s global activities. Greater task interdependence generates 
greater demand for coordination, which in turn magnifies the impact of institutions on the allocation of 
supervisory responsibilities.  
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I tested my hypotheses using data on the business activities and organization structures of U.S. 
multinational manufacturers from 1996 to 2008. My results show that MNC frontline subsidiaries in host 
countries with weaker institutions are more likely to be supervised by a foreign (as opposed to domestic) 
supervisory unit, especially when the subsidiaries’ tasks are more central to their MNC parent’s global 
operations or when their tasks are interdependent with a greater number of tasks performed by other 
subsidiaries.
1
 This suggests that selectively allocating supervisory responsibilities is an important 
managerial lever for MNCs in coordinating global operations. 
This paper relates to the literature on the trade-off between adaptation and coordination within 
multidivisional firms. In particular, it relates to studies about headquarters–subsidiary relationships within 
MNCs (Birkinshaw et al. 2006). Whereas most previous studies focused on the allocation of decision 
rights between the headquarters and a subsidiary as an independent dyad, this paper examines whether 
supervisory responsibilities for a subsidiary are assigned to a local or a foreign supervisory unit. It 
identifies the mechanism of differential supervision—that is, local supervision being granted to some 
subsidiaries but not to others—for selective intervention/coordination within MNCs. Local supervision of 
subsidiaries implies local autonomy for the local supervisory unit and subsidiaries as a group. In contrast, 
foreign supervision of frontline subsidiaries implies less local autonomy. By shifting the focus of analysis 
to allocation of the supervisory responsibilities, I hope to highlight one of the most unique features of 
MNCs: a multinational hierarchy that resides within a firm’s boundary but across national borders. 
This paper also relates to the literature on MNCs’ institution strategy, a topic that prior MNC 
headquarters–subsidiary relationship studies have not sufficiently explored. Those studies more often 
focused on product market conditions and held the institutional environment constant, whereas in reality, 
MNC subsidiaries’ institutional environments are no less critical than their product markets. The MNC 
institution strategy literature explicitly examines MNCs’ global strategy in dealing with weak institutions, 
                                                 
1
 In this study, unless otherwise specified, subsidiaries refer to MNC subsidiaries at the front line of business. In 
contrast, supervisory units refer to divisions, departments, groups, or non-frontline subsidiaries that the frontline 
subsidiaries report to. They include, but are not limited to, regional headquarters. 
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albeit mainly through the choice of subsidiary location or ownership type. By extending the analysis to 
MNCs’ use of differential supervision, this paper connects MNCs’ hierarchical structure with institutional 
imperfections or voids (Khanna and Palepu 2000) that give rise to the emergence of the firm in the first 
place.  It also complements an emerging body of work that examines how MNCs circumvent institutional 
obstacles when their location and ownership choices are limited (Alcácer 2006, Zhao 2006). 
In addition to the academic literature, the study also has implications for public policy and 
international business. One of the most significant features of MNCs is the extent to which they move 
resources across national borders (Dunning 2001). According to Kobrin (2001), because of these 
movements, MNCs are viewed as a compensating instrument for intrinsic cross-border market failures, 
and are uniquely positioned to take advantage of the asymmetry between an increasingly integrated global 
economic system and a still segmented political system. The MNCs’ ability to operate worldwide systems 
against the limited reach of any national authority “creates asymmetries of both information and 
jurisdiction” (p. 187). The increasing interdependencies among MNC activities around the globe weaken 
national governments’ control over their national economic actors and economic policy. MNCs have 
emerged as a source of private authority and gained increasing decision-making power vis-à-vis national 
states. This study sheds light on one important mechanism for MNCs to adapt their organization in 
response to national institutions: the allocation of supervision responsibilities across national borders. 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Headquarters–Subsidiary Relationship within MNCs 
MNC headquarters and their overseas subsidiaries both face trade-offs in managing their relationships. 
Like in all multidivisional firms, MNC headquarters need to balance the opposing demands for adaptation 
and coordination (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). In fact, this trade-off is particularly salient for MNCs. On 
the one hand, product demand and production conditions are usually more heterogeneous across countries 
than within countries, requiring a greater level of adaptation (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989). On the other 
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hand, to realize their competitive advantage of global arbitrage, MNCs need to coordinate their 
subsidiaries across a number of countries (Kogut 1983). This tradeoff creates a dilemma for MNC 
headquarters when it comes to the design of headquarters–subsidiary relationships: the more autonomous 
a firm’s subsidiaries are, the better they can adapt to idiosyncratic local conditions, but the less they can 
be coordinated around broad corporate objectives.  
MNC subsidiaries also face trade-offs. On the one hand, they need to adapt to local business 
environment to remain locally competitive (Rugman and Verbeke 2001). On the other hand, they need 
access to unique resources possessed by MNC headquarters, such as knowledge, management skills, 
global product reputation, production technology, and financial capital (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989). 
Autonomy enables local adaptation and optimization of local decision making, but an overly local focus 
might hinder subsidiaries’ ability to access corporate knowledge and resources.  
The literature has studied in great detail the benefits and costs of subsidiary autonomy. Autonomy is 
useful for firms operating in diverse product markets (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989). It allows subsidiaries 
to better adapt to their immediate task environment (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). It provides flexibility 
and creativity in local problem solving (Eisenmann and Bower 2000). It also saves time by localizing 
communication and information processing (Radner 1993). At the same time, an overly local focus 
hinders coordination. Locally autonomous teams may become isolated (Hass 2010, Monteiro et al. 2008). 
The benefits of local autonomy also vary by contingencies. For example, a more autonomous structure 
enhances a firm’s ability to adapt to its environment, but only if the environment is simple and the 
interdependencies between organization units are low. If the level of interdependencies is high, greater 
autonomy for each unit may jeopardize efforts in other units, hamper coordination, and hurt performance 
at the firm level (Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003). 
Whereas the literature has proposed many coordination mechanisms to manage MNC headquarters–
subsidiary relationships (Martinez and Jarillo 1989), one particular mechanism has been understudied: the 
intermediary units in MNCs’ formal hierarchical structure. This alone is unsatisfactory because (1) 
individuals (such as chief executive officers, or CEOs) and organization units (such as the general office 
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in headquarters) face limits in their cognitive capacity (Cyert and March 1963); (2) the diversity and 
complexity of global businesses taxes the attention of the top management teams (Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw 2008); and (3) multilayer hierarchical structures with intermediary units are a prevalent 
phenomenon within real MNCs. These intermediary units connect corporate headquarters with 
subsidiaries at the front line of businesses; they reduce span of control for the corporate headquarters and 
provide greater attention to resource allocation within a subgroup of subsidiaries (Birkinshaw et al. 2006). 
To study the role of intermediary supervisory units, I draw insights from the organization theories. 
The literature suggests that intermediary units assist in information processing and communication 
(Tushman and Nadler 1978). They solve problems emerging from multiple subordinate units (Eisenmann 
and Bower 2000), make joint decisions for multiple subordinate units (Marschak and Radner 1972), and 
exercise authority over assets useful for joint tasks—tasks to be jointly carried out by multiple 
subordinate units (Hart and Moore 2005). They set priorities when subordinates have different opinions 
(Hart and Moore 2005) and resolve conflicting expectations (Simon 1991). Together, these functions 
alleviate the coordination burden on top management.  
Unfortunately, prior studies on MNCs have largely focused on the MNC headquarters–subsidiary 
dyads and overlooked the intermediary supervisory units. They do not examine which unit (foreign or 
local) immediately above the frontline subsidiary in the corporate hierarchy has been granted the 
supervisory responsibility for the subsidiary. Therefore, the literature missed the most unique dimension 
of MNC structure: the allocation of formal supervisory responsibilities across national borders, where 
institutional environments differ. 
 
Dealing with Weak Institutions  
Although the MNC literature has a long tradition of studying integration and subsidiary autonomy based 
on a host country’s environment, much of this prior work has focused on cross-country differences in 
product market, knowledge endowment, and technology capabilities (Ambos et al. 2010, Rugman and 
Verbeke 2001), with the subsidiaries’ institutional environments kept constant. This treatment is at odds 
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with the reality of international business, in which MNCs with global networks of economic activities are 
constantly expanding into countries with institutions that are vastly different from those in their home 
countries. How could MNCs leverage their organization structure to manage the heterogeneous 
institutional environments facing their overseas subsidiaries is therefore an urgent question for the 
organization and strategy scholars. 
Institutions are humanly devised constraints that structure human interactions (North 1990). They 
include formal rules, laws, and constitutions, as well as informal norms of behavior and conventions. This 
study focuses on formal institutions. Strong institutions help firms grow. For example, law and order 
promotes the development of local financial markets, which in turn supply capital for firms’ investments 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998, Rajan and Zingales 1998). Efficient judicial systems increase 
incentive for innovation: firms in research and development (R&D)-intensive industries are larger in 
countries with better patent protection (Kumar et al. 2001).  
The literature on MNC strategies for combatting weak institutions may be usefully partitioned into 
two related themes: location and ownership. Accordingly, it has been suggested that MNCs can either (1) 
select locations with the greatest market or production opportunities and the least institutional constraints 
on creating value (Chang and Park 2005), or (2) pick ownership types (e.g., wholly owned subsidiaries 
versus joint ventures or alliances) that help safeguard value (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Oxley 1999). 
Both strategies have limitations, however. Location choices are limited primarily because arbitrage 
opportunities and institutional constraints often accompany each other: if MNCs only go to locations 
where institutions are strong, then their comparative advantage over domestic firms trading across borders 
will be significantly dampened. Ownership choices are similarly insufficient. MNCs’ ownership choices 
may be affected not only by governance considerations but also regulatory or normative pressures in their 
host countries (Svejnar and Smith 1984, Yiu and Makino 2002). Therefore, we need to broaden the search 
to include other design choices such as hierarchical structure. 
In sum, the MNC headquarters–subsidiary literature and the MNC institution strategy literature offer 
insights as well as opportunities. The opportunities arise from the as-yet missing link between the varied 
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institutional environments MNCs operate in and their deployment of hierarchical structure across those 
environments.  
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Even though the link between institutional quality and MNCs’ hierarchical structure has yet to be 
formally established in the literature, anecdotal evidence of such a link can be found in a number of 
classic books on MNCs (Galbraith 2000, Ghemawat 2007, Gupta et al. 2008, Hill 2012).  
According to these books, MNCs organize their subsidiaries along a number of dimensions. Some 
MNCs organize by global functional areas. For example, IBM located its global procurement center in 
China, global service delivery center in India, and global internal Web design centers in Brazil and 
Ireland. Hyundai established R&D centers in Germany, Japan, and the United States to supervise R&D 
subsidiaries in Europe, Asia, and North America, respectively. Some MNCs reorganize by global product 
divisions. For example, Eaton Corporation located its global center for light and medium truck 
transmissions in Amsterdam, the Netherlands (overseeing subsidiaries in Argentina, Brazil, India and 
Mexico) and its global center for automotive control business in Strasbourg, France. MNCs can also 
organize by customer profiles or technologies. Based on each subsidiary’s function, business segment, 
customer portfolio, technology or geographic location, it can report to different supervisory units. 
MNCs allocate supervisory and coordination responsibilities across host countries mostly based on 
the countries’ location-specific advantages. For example, when Procter & Gamble (P&G) was selecting a 
place to locate its headquarters for Global Business Services, it picked Costa Rica over against other low-
cost places such as Mexico (which ranks lower than Costa Rica in terms of institutional quality). P&G 
explained that the selection was made based on Costa Rica’s political stability, business climate, and 
telecommunications infrastructure (Luxner 2001). Microsoft is yet another example. Both China and India 
are among the fastest-growing markets for Microsoft, and its research centers in the two countries have 
become major powerhouses for research programs such as language and speech technologies, which are 
invaluable for Microsoft to localize its products. However, neither the Chinese nor the Indian research 
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center reports to Microsoft’s country headquarters in China or India; they both report to Microsoft 
Research based in Redmond, Washington, mostly as a result of concerns over high piracy and 
appropriation risks in these countries (Khanna and Choudhury 2007). These anecdotal examples motivate 
my theoretical development in this section. 
 
Cross-border Supervision in Weak-Institution Countries 
Over the last two decades, MNCs have increasingly dispersed their production networks to take 
advantage of locational advantages and global production scale, causing “the increasing 
interconnectedness of production processes in a vertical trading chain that stretches across many countries, 
with each country specializing in particular stages of a good’s production sequence” (Hummels et al. 
2001, p.76). Such a global value chain allows MNCs to exploit differences between their local units’ 
business environments for synergies at the corporate level (Ghemawat 2007). It also requires effective 
coordination across national borders.  One way to coordinate is to selectively grant autonomy to local 
units. Following prior studies (e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003), I conceptualize autonomy as the degree 
of freedom enjoyed by managers in making decisions, and as the amount of reporting they need to present 
to, and approval they need to seek from, parties above them in the corporate hierarchy. Also following 
prior studies (Ambos et al. 2010, Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008), I assume that supervision decisions are 
partially reflected in the structural position of the units, and that a lower level of direct monitoring is 
associated with a higher level of subsidiary autonomy.  
Coordination means managing interdependent tasks across business units (Malone and Crowston 
2001, Puranam et al. 2012). It entails making joint decisions and synchronizing joint actions for units 
undertaking these interdependent tasks. Both joint decision-making and joint action synchronization are 
subject to institutional influences.  
Joint decision-making requires the gathering, interpreting and synthesis of information (Tushman and 
Nadler 1978), and institutions affect the quality of joint decision making by influencing the availability of 
information (Arrow 1959, North 1990). Both government and corporate information affect business 
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decision making (Gelos and Wei 2005). First, national and regional economic indicators published by 
governments on consumption, production, capacity utilization, and inflation help firms smooth their 
production cycles across multiple plants, and synchronize procurement, production, and delivery. Without 
these complementary data, local information—about a locally contained demand or supply shock, for 
example—becomes less valuable. Second, without effective regulations for financial and accounting 
disclosure, fair competition, and IPR protection, firms will share less information with their investors, 
customers, and industry peers; they will instead practice more trade secrecy in their host country. This 
further reduces the amount of business information available in the local environment. Finally, in addition 
to domestic government and corporate information, institutions may regulate the availability of 
international information through censorship.  
The lack of reliable information in WICs hurts local businesses. For example, when a number of 
transitional economies first opened their borders for foreign investment, there were few regulations that 
promoted information disclosure. Market intelligence was difficult to collect. It has been shown that a 
severe lack of information (or the perception of it) encourages economic agents to herd in their behavior 
based on observed patterns of others rather than on fundamentals (Bikhchandani et al. 1992, Garcia-Pont 
and Nohria 2002). As a result, domestic firms gambled with perceived business opportunities and 
followed each other’s past successful moves, often into overly crowded markets with thin profit margins. 
In response to the lack of local information, both domestic firms and MNCs can increase their local 
information-seeking efforts. For MNCs, they can hire local managers or station their foreign managers 
locally so that these managers are on the ground and embedded in the local context to develop the ability 
to understand the nuances of local politics and market information. However, if MNCs merely increase-
their effort in seeking local information, as their domestic competitors do, they will not gain much 
competitive advantage. This is because MNCs’ competitive advantage comes from global or regional 
coordination in order to move resources across national borders (Dunning 2001), which needs more than 
isolated local information. Cross-border coordination also needs complementary information, which is 
often not available in WICs but available in strong-institution countries where policies are more 
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transparent, rules and norms for disclosure are stronger, and censorship is less prevalent. MNCs have to 
strike a balance between seeking both local and complementary information. One solution is to have local 
subsidiaries in weak-institution countries specialize in collecting local information but add a layer of 
supervisory units in strong-institution countries to synthesize local information in weak-institution 
countries with complementary information collected in strong-institution countries. Firms with units in 
both weak-institution and strong institution countries will have more tools for information synthesizing 
and coordination. MNCs enjoy this unique organizational advantage.  
In short, MNCs can partially solve the problem of information scarcity in a subset of their external 
environment by changing internal channels of information. Local supervision should decrease as the 
reliability of local information—relative to the information available elsewhere in the organization—
decreases (Harris and Raviv 2005). For example, MNCs sometimes set up strong local presence or hire 
consultants in WICs to collect local information. However, they almost always combine local information 
with additional local, regional, or global data in regional hubs such as Hong Kong and Singapore, where 
better institutions support knowledge and information sharing. Armed with a superior quality and quantity 
of information, MNC supervisory units in these hubs coordinated MNCs’ regional activities, including 
reporting, competitor intelligence, and strategy formation (Enright 2000). The colocation of resource 
allocation and strategic decision making with information gathering and sharing makes coordination more 
efficient (Benito et al. 2011).
 
Whereas making joint decisions depends on sufficient information, synchronizing joint actions 
between organization units requires that each unit have control over its resources to take the necessary 
actions. As today’s global companies build up increasingly tightly yet broadly connected global 
production networks, they rely more and more on the control of their core resources to fulfill quality and 
speedy delivery on a global scale. MNC subsidiaries carrying out adjacent productive processes along a 
global value chain increasingly rely on each other’s input to deliver their own output. Institutions affect 
the coordination of joint actions by influencing the clarity of property rights, which provide the ultimate 
right of control over assets (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). By protecting property rights against 
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expropriation and corruption, institutions help to align ownership and control rights, thereby facilitating 
coordination (North 1990).  
Guarding against expropriation risk is not just about protecting the underlying resources. More 
importantly, it is about protecting the integrity of the decision rights with respect to the use of these assets 
(e.g., decisions about applying resources to new geographic markets or about launching new products). 
Even though local supervision gives local units flexibility to allocate resources and better adapt to local 
environments, it also exposes local managers to influence from the local environment. Therefore, units 
that operate in countries with weak property right protection and high levels of corruption are at greater 
risk of losing their operations than units in strong institution countries. Losing operations in one country 
may negatively affect subsequent operations of MNC units in other countries. In addition, the lack of 
predictability and reliability inherent to assets in WICs makes it difficult to coordinate joint productive 
activities.  
Each MNC subsidiary has a double personality: it is both a local corporation and a unit in a 
multinational network under the control of its MNC parent (Kobrin 2001). When local units are delegated 
supervisory responsibilities, they are expected to conform more with host country institutions than with 
an MNC’s internal anticorruption practices. They will be subject to greater pressure from corrupt local 
entities. Corrupt entities in the host country will demand more bribery from autonomous local units than 
from units under foreign supervision (Spencer and Gomez 2011). Therefore, reassigning supervisory 
responsibilities to a unit in a foreign country will limit an MNC’s exposure to expropriation risks in the 
subsidiary’s host country. In addition, as centralization demonstrates to internal and external stakeholders 
that headquarters’ policies are being enforced (Gates and Egelhoff 1986), nonlocal supervision signals the 
MNC’s overall commitment to global objectives and reinforces its anticorruption reputation, discouraging 
bribery requests from corrupted entities in the host country. 
In sum, operating simultaneously across countries with a variety of institutional quality allows MNCs 
to strategically allocate supervisory responsibilities. To coordinate with activities in WICs, MNCs are 
more likely to employ foreign supervision.
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Hypothesis 1 (H1). MNC subsidiaries in host countries with weaker institutions are more likely to 
be under foreign supervision. 
 
Task Interdependence and Cross-Border Supervision 
Task interdependence in this study refers to intermediate inputs being supplied from one unit to another or 
passed back and forth in successive stages of production (Thompson 1967). It exists in the network of 
value-chain activities interrelated through physical input–output feedback loops that transfer and 
transform information and materials (Baldwin 2008, Porter 1985, Sturgeon 2002). MNCs’ global 
productive network can be viewed as a system of interdependent tasks. For example, Toyota’s global 
pickup truck production process will collect common engines and manual transmissions from Asian 
plants to assembly bases in Asia, Latin America and Africa and distribute to almost all major markets 
around the world (Ghemawat 2007). As MNCs keep segmenting their value chains and dispersing each of 
their value chain activities to optimal location, their subsidiaries are becoming more and more diverse and 
interdependent at the same time, demanding “collaborative information sharing and problem solving, 
cooperative support and resource sharing, and collective action and implementation”(Bartlett and Ghoshal 
1987, p 47). Among all the interdependent subsidiaries, those with tasks more central to MNCs’ global 
operations, or those with tasks interdependent with a greater number of tasks performed by other 
subsidiaries, require more multilateral coordination. 
Task interdependence makes autonomy in decision making less effective. When decision variables 
are highly interdependent, autonomy implies that individual decisions will be made based on partial 
information and will not be globally optimal (Marschak and Radner 1972). Similar arguments can be 
made of autonomy causing joint action to be less effective. According to Galbraith and Lawler (1993), the 
more imperative the need for lateral coordination between subunits, the greater the need for hierarchical 
intervention that deals with increasingly aggregated levels of the organization system. For example, if the 
subsidiaries are highly interdependent because they share resources, technology, or customers, it is 
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important for their common supervisors to forge business directions (regarding common technology and 
product strategy) so that the subsidiaries’ operations do not conflict with each other. In addition, for issues 
that cannot be resolved laterally between subsidiaries, a common boss helps to speed up or finalize joint 
decisions and allows uncertainties to be resolved more quickly. 
The coordination challenges in WICs as a result of information scarcity will be more detrimental for 
an MNC if its WIC subsidiaries also perform more central tasks. A lack of complementary information 
makes it harder for supervisory units in WICs to aggregate, benchmark, evaluate and synthesize discrete 
local information so as to make decisions. Decision errors for a central subsidiary will have a greater 
adverse effect on other subsidiaries than decision errors for a peripheral subsidiary. Even if these other 
subsidiaries are outside WICs, they will find it harder to predict the decisions made in WICs and schedule 
their own actions accordingly. Therefore, assigning supervisory responsibilities for central subsidiaries to 
a country outside the WIC where information is more abundant will help manage coordination challenges 
for the MNC. 
Similarly, the coordination challenges in WICs as a result of property rights ambiguity will be more 
harmful to an MNC if its WIC subsidiaries also perform more central tasks. A lack of clear property 
rights protection makes it harder for supervisory units in WICs to fend off expropriation and maintain full 
control of MNC assets and resources in the host countries. Protecting the assets and resources of a central 
subsidiary is more critical for other subsidiaries than protecting the assets and resources of a peripheral 
subsidiary. Therefore, assigning supervisory responsibilities for central subsidiaries to a country outside 
WIC where expropriation risk is low will help manage coordination challenges for the MNC. 
In sum, a central subsidiary’s failure to perform a task can have a cascading effect on all dependent 
subsidiaries. Therefore, when a subsidiary’s task is more tightly integrated into its MNC parent’s global 
network, less local autonomy should be granted. When subsidiaries located in WICs are also responsible 
for tasks that are more central to MNCs’ global operations, the MNC parent should be even more likely to 
employ foreign supervision for them. 
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Hypothesis 2(H2) MNC subsidiaries in countries with weak institutions are more likely to be 
under foreign supervision when their tasks are more central to their parent’s global operations.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The hypotheses were tested based on the geographic location and business activities of U.S. 
manufacturing MNCs, and the supervision relationships within them, in 1996-2008. The level of analysis 
is MNC subsidiary-year: I estimate the probability that an MNC subsidiary will be supervised by a 
supervisory unit in the same host country rather than a supervisory unit in a different country. This 
empirical setting is suitable because, first, manufacturing often entails multiple stages of production and 
requires large quantities of intermediate inputs. This provides large variation in business activities across 
firms and their subsidiaries in the same primary industry.  Second, firms in the manufacturing sector face 
fierce global competition and intense pressure to outsource and restructure, making their decisions about 
firm scope and structure critical to firm growth. For example, in the automotive industry, Toyota beat 
General Motor (GM) in first-quarter global car sales in 2007, ending more than 75 years of GM 
dominance (Chozick and Shirouzu 2007). Sliding market shares and profits put U.S. automakers under 
tremendous pressure to restructure their overly cumbersome production systems and relocate more 
component production and processes to overseas affiliates. One of Ford’s key restructuring initiatives was 
to sell 17 U.S.-based component plants and 6 component facilities (Ford Motor Company 2007). At 
Renault-Nissan, worse-than-expected earnings reports raised so much skepticism about CEO Carlos 
Ghosn’s ability to manage the company’s complex global businesses that Ghosn was forced to turn over 
responsibilities for North American markets to another executive and establish multiple regional offices 
(Morse and Shirouzu 2007). Finally, by focusing on U.S. MNCs only, I controlled for heterogeneity in 
home-country institutions that could either affect MNCs’ political capability or strategy (Holburn and 
Zelner 2010). 
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Data and Sample  
 
Testing the hypotheses requires data on (1) MNC subsidiaries’ business activities and their 
interdependence with other units, (2) each subsidiary’s geographic location and the quality of institutions 
at those locations, and (3) the assignment of supervisory responsibilities for each subsidiary. Information 
about MNC subsidiaries was drawn from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA), provided by 
LexisNexis. For firms with more than 300 employees and $10 million in revenue, DCA describes 
reporting/supervision relationships between their units (groups, departments, divisions, subsidiaries, etc.) 
to the seventh level of corporate linkage (LexisNexis 2005). Based on my conversation with DCA 
analysts, “reporting” includes mainly hierarchical authority in supervision. This is because a major usage 
of the database is for potential suppliers, customers, acquirers, investors, and other business partners to 
easily identify which supervisory unit makes the relative decisions for a subordinate unit in a business 
segment and/or geographic area. LexisNexis collects information from the companies, annual reports, and 
business publications in the LexisNexis database; it also contacts each company to verify the information. 
Its analysts extensively edit and validate the content to prevent errors before database entry. DCA also 
reports the segments (four-digit Standard Industrial Classifications codes, or SICs) of each subsidiary, and 
supplies detailed street addresses for most of them. (A small number of missing street addresses were 
added by searching company websites.) The DCA data set for publicly traded U.S. firms in 1996-2008 
contains 1,902 MNC parent companies with primary industries in the manufacturing sector.  
Here is an example from the DCA data set. Ford Motor Company’s main industry is SIC 3711 
(“motor vehicles and passenger car bodies”). In addition, it has subsidiaries operating in SIC 6141 
(“personal credit institutions”). Among those operating in SIC 6141, the Belgian and Spanish subsidiaries 
report locally, whereas the Italian and Brazilian subsidiaries report to divisions in the United States. This 
is consistent the fact that Belgium and Spain rank higher than Italy and Brazil in terms of institutional 
quality. In addition, Ford Motor has subsidiaries operating in SIC 3724 (“aircraft engines and engine 
parts”). In contrast to the Spanish subsidiary operating in SIC 6141, the Spanish subsidiary operating in 
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SIC 3724 reports not locally but to supervisory units in Sweden. This is consistent with my task centrality 
arguments. Engine manufacturing is more central to Ford’s global operations than personal credit card 
business, therefore, we observe that  the Spanish subsidiary in the engine business reports to Sweden, a 
country with higher institutional quality than Spain, but the Spanish subsidiary in the personal credit card 
business reports locally. 
Financial information about MNC parents was extracted from Compustat. The data sets were matched 
by company names. Ambiguous matches were further verified using company websites. A total of 1,602 
(84%) MNC parent companies were matched.  
Macroeconomic and institutions data about each host country were collected from the World Bank 
and other multinational organizations. Among the 125 countries hosting MNC subsidiaries in the sample 
period, data were available for 111. One hundred small MNCs had no operations in these 111 countries 
and were dropped from the sample. To control for the possibility that some units were established to 
facilitate tax evasion, I excluded units located in tax havens and units that had supervising units in tax 
heavens.
2
 Because my measure of task centrality relies on intersegment relationships, I also dropped 94 
MNCs that operated in one segment only. Finally, I dropped observations with missing values.  
I focused on organization units that represent the lowest level of profit-center responsibility and, 
therefore, can be compared across firms. Consequently, I included only frontline subsidiaries (subsidiaries 
that have no subordinate subsidiaries). For each subsidiary I identified a supervisory unit based on the 
corporate hierarchy reported in DCA. In all, my final sample includes 1,332 MNCs with 14,886 
subsidiaries in 96 foreign countries, for a total of 70,901 subsidiary-year observations. 
Unfortunately, existing measures of institutional quality are mostly comprehensive and do not break 
down into information availability or property rights. Therefore, as a robustness check, I collected 
                                                 
2
 Tax havens are those listed by Hines and Rice (1994, Appendix 2) and Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2002). 
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regional measures of transparency and the rule of law from the World Value Surveys (WVSs), in order to 
relate foreign supervision more directly to information and property rights. WVS is an ongoing, cross-
country project coordinated by the Institute of Social Research at the University of Michigan. The WVS 
samples from populations representing more than 88% of the world total to assess the social, moral, 
religious, and political values of different cultures across regions within each surveyed country. 
Therefore, the regional survey also allows me to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. 
The survey is carried out in three to five-year cycles. The most recent cycles covered 1994-1998, 1999-
2004, and 2005-2008. I manually matched each subsidiary location with regions covered by the WVS. I 
was able to match locations for 7,595 (49%) frontline subsidiaries from 1,087 (81%) MNC parents to 
WVS regions, resulting in a total of 20,561 subsidiary-year observations. These matched WVS regions 
are in 45 non-tax haven and non-island countries.  
Variables  
 
My dependent variable is local supervision. I estimated the probability that a subsidiary shares a host 
country with its supervisory unit, indicating more local supervision. The dummy variable, 
LocalSupervision, is 1 if a subsidiary is supervised by a supervisory unit in the same host country as 
opposed to a supervisory unit in a different country.  
The main independent variable, QualityofInstitutions, is the average value of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGIs) developed by the World Bank Group (Kaufmann et al. 2010). WGIs are 
reported annually along six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
Because these indicators are highly correlated (ρ=0.68-0.95), I used their average value to measure a 
country’s overall quality of institutions in a given year. As would be expected, there is high correlation 
between current and lagged estimates of a country’s governance. Nevertheless, many countries show 
significant governance changes over time. WGI authors report that, between 2000 and 2009, 18 countries 
experienced changes significant at the 75% confidence interval in each of the six indicators, and 54 
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countries experienced a significant change in at least one of the six indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2010). 
Table 1 presents the list of 81 foreign countries hosting my sample MNC units during 2008, ranked by 
average WGIs.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
For estimations based on WVSs at the regional level, I measured the quality of institutions based on 
local residents’ confidence in the rule of law (the police and the justice system) and information 
transparency (the press). Respondents chose from one of the four answers: a great deal of confidence, 
quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all. Following prior studies that 
use WVS to measure institutions (Bloom et al. 2012), I used the percentage of respondents who reported 
“a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence. 
TaskCentrality reflects the centrality of the focal subsidiary’s task in the MNC’s task system. For 
each subsidiary, I calculated the number of same-MNC subsidiaries (in or outside the United States) 
whose primary segments have significant input-output flows to and from the focal subsidiary’s primary 
segment, as a percentage of the number of all subsidiaries of the same MNC parent. In robustness checks, 
I used a dummy variable to measure whether the subsidiary and its MNC parent have significant input-
output flows to and from one another; the results are similar. 
To construct the measure, I used the Benchmark Input-Output (IO) “Use” tables provided by the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The Tables contain the value of pair-wise commodity flows among 
IO industries and can be converted to commodity flows among SIC industries through an IO-SIC 
concordance (Fan and Lang 2000). They are updated every five years. Because the BEA changed the IO 
industry coding system in 1997, I used the 1992 tables to ensure comparability. Except for the code 
change, coefficients in the tables have been fairly stable over time (Fan and Lang 2000). The use of IO-
table coefficients as proxies for inter-segment relationships within diversified firms has been adopted by 
studies in finance, economics, and management (Schoar 2002, Villalonga 2004, Zhou 2011). In their 
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study, Alfaro and Charlton (2009) used the input-output tables to identify subsidiaries that provide inputs 
to their parent firms. 
For each MNC-year I constructed a task matrix. If an MNC has N subsidiaries (U.S. and foreign) in a 
given year, the task matrix is an N X N matrix whose entries (i, j) and (j,i) are set to x’s if subsidiary i’s 
and subsidiary j’s primary segments on average contribute more than 1% of the input to one another 
according to the IO tables. Based on the task matrix I then counted the total number of x’s in row i 
divided by N as a measure of task centrality for subsidiary i.  
Besides the factor variables of institutional quality and task centrality, I added several control 
variables. I included year dummies to capture macroeconomic, political, and cultural factors that could 
change the propensity to local supervision over time. At the host-country level, I controlled for the gross 
domestic product (GDP) (in constant year 2000 dollars), which reflects a country’s general level of 
development (such as human capital) and is expected to have a positive correlation with local autonomy. I 
also controlled for telecommunication using the number of Internet users per 100 people in the 
population. Better telecommunication technology would make it easier to transfer complementary 
information collected throughout the organization to local units, increasing the efficiency of local 
autonomy. Additionally, to further dilute the impact of tax regimes on organization structure, I controlled 
for the effective corporate income tax rate.  
At the level of MNC parent firms, I first controlled for firm age and size. Older firms have more 
experience dealing with heterogeneous environments and are more likely to develop coordination 
knowledge and routines (Nelson and Winter 1982), facilitating autonomy. Top management teams at 
larger firms are also more likely to be overloaded and to prefer more delegation (Aghion and Tirole 
1997). In addition, to capture each MNC’s experience and scale of operations by country, I controlled for 
the number of frontline subsidiaries an MNC has in each country. An MNC’s country-specific experience 
enhances its local political capability to manage weak institutions (Holburn and Zelner 2010), facilitating 
local supervision. A larger number of local operations also raises the importance of local coordination and 
decision making, encouraging local supervision. 
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At the subsidiary level, I first controlled for the business need for local supervision. A subsidiary that 
operates in a different business segment than its MNC parent benefits more from local adaptation and 
therefore local supervision. This is because, when an MNC parent does not possess expertise in a 
subsidiary’s business, the subsidiary needs to source more skills from local environment (Chang and 
Rosenzweig 2001). It is therefore more likely to be supervised locally. I then controlled for subsidiary 
age. Older subsidiaries should be more experienced with local institutions and should therefore require 
less supervision from outside the host country. Older subsidiaries are also more likely to develop higher 
capabilities and require less resources from their parent headquarters; therefore they will demand more 
autonomy (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998). I do not have data on subsidiary size. Instead, I controlled for a 
subsidiary’s product scope (number of four-digit SICs in which it operates). Subsidiaries undertaking a 
wider range of activities are expected to be larger and be supervised locally.   
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample. There is large variation across countries in the 
quality of institutions. The WGI has a mean value of 0.26 and a standard deviation of 0.86. The host 
countries in the sample have an average GDP of $0.27 billion in constant 2000 dollars, an average 
effective corporate tax rate of 30%, and an average of 19 Internet users per 100 people. At the MNC 
parent level, an average MNC in the sample has about $1.8 billion (exp(7.48)) in sales, is about 51 
(exp(3.94)) years old, and operates 1.4 (exp(0.32)) frontline subsidiaries in each host country. At the 
subsidiary level, the average age is 32.5 (exp(3.48)) years old. Local supervision is observed in about 6% 
of the subsidiary-year observations. Table 2 also shows that an average subsidiary operates in 1.24 
segments, and has significant input-output flows with 30% of its MNC parent’s other subsidiaries. 
Among subsidiaries, 63% operate in a primary segment different from their corporate parent. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 presents two preliminary analyses of the span of control for supervisory units in countries of 
different institutional quality. First, if coordination is indeed more difficult in WICs as I argued in the 
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theory section, we would expect supervisory units in WICs to have narrower span of control (controlling 
for the total number of subsidiaries in a host country). Based on this intuition, column (1) in Table 3 
estimates the maximum span of control (the maximum number of subsidiaries supervised by any 
supervisory unit of an MNC in a host country) against institutional quality. The results show that indeed, 
supervisory units in weaker institution countries have a narrower span of control. Second, if coordinating 
WIC subsidiaries is more difficult, we would expect supervisory units in strong-institution countries to 
have narrower span of control if a larger proportion of their subordinate subsidiaries are in WICs. 
Accordingly, column (2) estimates the span of control for each supervisory unit in strong-institution 
countries. I split the countries into two groups: strong-institution countries whose institutional quality is 
above the median level of institutional quality for all countries in a given year, and weak-institution 
countries whose institutional quality is at or below the median level. I then included only supervisory 
units in strong-institution countries for this analysis. For each supervisory unit, I calculated its span of 
control as the number of subsidiaries across all countries that directly report to it. As an independent 
variable I used the percentage of the supervisory unit’s subsidiaries that are in WICs. The results show 
that indeed, supervisory units in strong-institution countries have a narrower span of control if a larger 
proportion of their subordinate subsidiaries are in weak-institution countries. Therefore, Table 3 confirms 
my intuition and provides an indirect support for H1. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Model Specification 
 
I adopted the following logit model: 
 
(1), 
 ctitjictjictctjictctjict CFUKIKIvisionLocalSuperE *]1[ 3210 
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where LocalSupervisionjict is a dummy variable that equals 1 if subsidiary j of MNC i in host country c 
and year t is supervised by a unit in the same host country,
3
 ctI  is the quality of institutions in country c 
and year t, and jictK  is task centrality of subsidiary j of MNC i in year t.  The subsidiary-, MNC Parent-, 
and host-country-specific characteristics are denoted by jictU , itF  , and ctC  respectively. Hypothesis 1 
predicts that β1>0. H2 predicts that β3>0. 
Because the residuals of a given MNC may be correlated across countries as a result of unobserved 
firm heterogeneity, and the residuals of a given country may be correlated across firms as a results of 
unobserved country heterogeneity, I adjusted standard errors to account for these two dimensions of 
within-cluster correlation (Petersen 2009).  
RESULTS 
 
Table 4 presents estimations based on Equation (1). Column (1) contains only control variables at the 
country level. As expected, subsidiaries in higher GDP countries were more likely to be supervised 
locally. Telecommunication positively affected local supervision and tax rate negatively affected local 
supervision, although these coefficients are not statistically significant. Column (2) adds quality of 
institutions; it had a significant and positive impact on local supervision. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Column (3) adds MNC parent characteristics. As expected, subsidiaries of larger MNCs were more 
likely to be supervised locally. The impact of MNC age was positive but not significant. Also as 
expected, the more subsidiaries an MNC operated in a host country, the more likely they were to be 
supervised locally. Column (4) adds unit characteristics. The coefficients were not statistically significant. 
                                                 
3
 I ran a robustness check to estimate the probability that a subsidiary reports to a supervisory unit in a country with 
stronger institutions than the subsidiary’s host country on a smaller sample where institution data for the supervisory 
unit’s host country are available. Results were similar. 
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With all control variables in place, the quality of institutions continued to have a positive impact on local 
supervision. Thus, H1 is supported. 
Column (5) adds task centrality, and column (6) adds its interaction with institutional quality. Results 
show that task centrality was negatively correlated with local supervision: the more a subsidiary was 
interdependent with an MNC’s global operations, the less likely it was supervised locally. This negative 
effect was amplified for units in countries with weaker institutions. Thus, H2 is supported. 
The impact of institutional quality on local supervision became weaker when more control and 
independent variables were added, but it remained economically and statistically significant. A marginal-
effect analysis based on column (6) suggests that increasing the quality of institutions by one point, while 
keeping all other variables at their mean values, increased the probability of local supervision by 1.4%.  
Finally, Table 5 moves the logit analysis in Equation (1) from the country level to the regional level. 
Variables are comparable to those in Table 4, but institutional quality is measured by residents’ 
confidence in regional transparency and the rule of law. Column (1) includes the same country-level 
control variables as in Table 4. Column (2) uses country dummies to control for unobserved country-level 
heterogeneity. The results are similar: though statistically weaker than the country-level results, they are 
still supportive of H1 and H2.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Overall, the results in Tables 3-5 show that, consistent with my hypotheses, subsidiaries located in 
weak-institution countries or regions were less likely to be supervised locally, and that this effect was 
stronger when the subsidiaries’ activities were more central to their MNC parents’ global operations. In 
addition to these main results, I ran a host of robustness checks to control for additional factors that might 
influence local supervision, including factors at the MNC level (total levels of hierarchy, R&D intensity, 
etc), the industry level (growth, capital and R&D intensity, competition, etc.), and the country level 
(language, distance to the United States in terms of knowledge, globalization, geography, financial 
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development, demography, administration, country dummies, etc.); the results were similar. I also ran a 
conditional logit model with MNC fixed effects; the sample size is smaller but the results are similar. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines how MNCs may use organization structure to manage the effects of institutional 
quality on business activities across countries. The supervision relationships with respect to overseas 
subsidiaries of U.S. multinational manufacturers in 1996–2008 show that MNCs do, indeed, strategically 
assign supervisory responsibilities to enhance coordination across diverse global operations.  
This paper’s core theoretical contribution is establishing differential supervision as a mechanism for 
selective intervention and managing coordination challenges across heterogeneous institutional 
environments. It also supports a view of the firm as a complex system of interdependent activities that 
must be actively coordinated to realize benefits from integration (Zhou 2011, 2013). Although a primary 
function of MNCs is to exploit arbitrage opportunities arising from transaction costs across institutional 
environments, internalizing transaction costs creates coordination challenges as well. A hierarchical 
structure across national boundaries allows differential supervision, thereby balancing the trade-off 
between adaptation and coordination. The finding that MNCs may design their organization structures to 
mitigate institutional obstacles also complements existing studies on MNCs’ location and ownership 
choices. 
This study offers implications for managers as well as policy makers. It highlights a channel through 
which MNCs “redistribute” managerial responsibilities away from WICs. During the past two decades, 
governments in developing countries have been working to improve “hard” conditions—building 
infrastructure, giving special tax breaks or subsidies to MNCs, and raising the educational level of their 
labor force—to attract foreign direct investments. These incentives may attract foreign investments, but 
MNCs in these countries may only engage in fragmented business activities aimed mainly at leveraging a 
cheaper labor force, engineering talent or market potential, without delegating substantial corporate or 
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regional responsibilities to local management teams. To the extent that managers make decisions about 
resource allocation on a daily basis, institutional quality will have a profound impact on the sustainable 
development of the host country’s economy. 
This study has a few limitations that invite future research. First, it treats subsidiaries’ locations and 
tasks as predetermined and studies their impact on organization structure. It does not further investigate 
why some firms choose to integrate certain productive activities at certain locations while others 
standardize and outsource them. Although firms can certainly alter their task systems—rather than their 
organization structures—to make coordination easier, the literature suggests that firms often make 
decisions about tasks based on factors other than coordination. For example, firms may integrate certain 
activities to leverage their core competencies into adjacent value chain activities (Leiblein and Miller 
2003), to accommodate differential positioning strategies for their products (Argyres and Bigelow 2010), 
or to preserve an integral knowledge of product architecture that deters imitation  (Ethiraj et al. 2008). 
These corporate, product, and R&D strategies may constrain firms from adopting independent task 
systems and present opportunities for organization design. How firms endogenously choose their 
organization structures and their tasks at each location is left for future study. 
In addition, the measure of “differential supervision” is based on the physical location of the 
supervisory units. I conceptualized that if the subsidiary reports to a foreign rather than local unit, then 
less autonomy is given to the group of supervisory units and frontline subsidiaries in the country as a 
group. My data set does not allow me to capture the exact decisions that are made by the subsidiaries and 
those that are made by the supervisory units. Although the paper is not about the delegation of specific 
decision rights with respect to each subsidiary, it will still be important to learn exactly what activity 
types are supervised by foreign versus local supervisory units. This is a topic left for future study when 
detailed data about allocation of decision-making rights between supervisory units and subsidiaries 
become available.  
 Despite its caveats, this paper connects organization structure with institutional imperfections that 
give rise to the emergence of the firm in the first place. It theorizes and quantifies the relationships 
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between interdependence, organization structure, and institutions using a large sample of firms. This 
effort will hopefully deepen our understanding of the firm and its integration mechanisms, and motivate 
future research exploiting the rich and complex reality of the firm.  
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Figure 1. MNC structures under different institutional environments 
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Table 1.Countries Hosting Sample MNCs Ranked by World Bank Governance Indicators (2008) 
 
RANK COUNTRY WGI RANK COUNTRY WGI RANK COUNTRY WGI 
1 DENMARK 1.796 28 LATVIA 0.651 55 ZAMBIA -0.295 
2 FINLAND 1.764 29 POLAND 0.629 56 THAILAND -0.298 
3 SWEDEN 1.745 30 ISRAEL 0.592 57 PERU -0.298 
4 NEW ZEALAND 1.715 31 GREECE 0.570 58 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA -0.329 
5 NETHERLANDS 1.674 32 COSTA RICA 0.556 59 GUYANA -0.381 
6 NORWAY 1.666 33 ITALY 0.547 60 COLOMBIA -0.383 
7 AUSTRALIA 1.652 34 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 0.407 61 UKRAINE -0.395 
8 CANADA 1.648 35 CROATIA 0.379 62 CHINA -0.465 
9 AUSTRIA 1.624 36 MALAYSIA 0.263 63 PHILIPPINES -0.484 
10 ICELAND 1.600 37 BULGARIA 0.256 64 INDONESIA -0.501 
11 GERMANY 1.503 38 
TRINIDAD & 
TOBAGO 0.185 65 FIJI -0.525 
12 UK 1.478 39 ROMANIA 0.178 66 EGYPT -0.528 
13 BELGIUM 1.260 40 GHANA 0.065 67 HONDURAS -0.535 
14 FRANCE 1.241 41 BRAZIL 0.039 68 GUATEMALA -0.545 
15 JAPAN 1.203 42 JAMAICA -0.038 69 VIETNAM -0.555 
16 CHILE 1.153 43 TURKEY -0.053 70 GABON -0.608 
17 PORTUGAL 1.086 44 TUNISIA -0.054 71 KENYA -0.681 
18 ESTONIA 1.036 45 SURINAME -0.061 72 PARAGUAY -0.695 
19 SLOVENIA 0.976 46 
SERBIA AND 
MONTENEGRO -0.081 73 RUSSIA -0.727 
20 SPAIN 0.949 47 EL SALVADOR -0.090 74 BOLIVIA -0.741 
21 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 0.888 48 MEXICO -0.137 75 CAMBODIA -0.785 
22 HUNGARY 0.813 49 INDIA -0.171 76 ECUADOR -0.865 
23 MAURITIUS 0.782 50 SENEGAL -0.250 77 ANGOLA -0.988 
24 SLOVAKIA 0.778 51 
SAUDI 
ARABIA -0.251 78 NIGERIA -1.042 
25 SOUTH KOREA 0.703 52 ARGENTINA -0.266 79 PAKISTAN -1.086 
26 LITHUANIA 0.687 53 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC -0.269 80 VENEZUELA -1.145 
27 URUGUAY 0.673 54 MOROCCO -0.277 81 IVORY COAST -1.359 
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Table 2. Variable definition and summary statistics 
 
  Definition Mean SD Min Max 
Country level variables
a
      
 QualityofInstitutions Average value of Worldwide Governance Indicators 0.26 0.86 -1.70 1.96 
 HostCountryGDP GDP per World Development Indicators, in billions of 
constant year 2000 dollars 
0.27 0.63 0.001 5.21 
 HostCountryTaxRate  Effective corporate income tax rate 30.37 6.94 5 50 
 HostCountryTelecommunication  Internet users per 100 people per World Development 
Indicators 
18.64 22.51 0.001 92.14 
MNC parent level variables      
 MNCSize
b,e
 Log (sales in million dollars) 7.48 2.04 -2.99 12.48 
 MNCAge
b,e
 Log (years since MNC establishment) 3.94 0.84 -2.99 5.45 
 LocalScale
c,e
 Log (number of MNC subsidiaries in the country) 0.32 0.52 0.05 4.23 
Subsidiary level variable
d
      
 LocalSupervision (1,0) Equals 1 if the MNC subsidiary is supervised by a unit within 
the same host country 
0.06 0.23 0 1 
 TaskCentrality Percentage of MNC subsidiaries whose primary segments are 
interdependent with the focal subsidiary’s primary segment 
0.30 0.27 0 0.99 
 SubsidiaryProductScope Number of segments (four-digit SICs) in which the subsidiary 
operates 
1.24 0.67 1 10 
 Subsidiary-MNC_DifferentBusinesses (1,0) Equals 1 if the subsidiary operates in a different four-digit SIC 
than its MNC parent (1,0) 
0.63 0.48 0 1 
 SubsidiaryAge
e
 log (years since subsidiary establishment) 3.48 0.88 -2.99 6.14 
a
N=1067 country-year observations. 
b
N=13490 MNC-year observations. 
c
N=45968 MNC-host country-year observations. 
d
N=71054 MNC subsidiary-host country-year observations. 
e
log value.  
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Table 3. Span of Control and Institutions 
 
 (1) 
Maximum span of control 
for MNC supervisory 
units in a host country 
 (2) 
 Span of control for MNC 
supervisory units in 
strong-institution 
countries 
    
    
QualityofInstitutions 0.015***   
 [0.005]   
Number of subordinate subsidiaries in 
WICs as a percentage of total number of 
subordinate subsidiaries in all countries  
 
-13.002*** 
   [0.446] 
MNCSize 0.014  0.033 
 [0.009]  [0.092] 
MNCAge -0.043**  -0.594** 
 [0.017]  [0.271] 
LocalScale 0.372***  1.131*** 
 [0.005]  [0.081] 
HostCountryTaxRates -0.001  0.037 
 [0.000]  [0.022] 
HostCountryTelecommunication 0.001***  -0.018 
 [0.000]  [0.014] 
HostCountryGDP 0.004*  2E-14 
 [0.002]  [1E-13] 
Constant 0.023  6.110*** 
 [0.093]  [1.535] 
    
Year dummies Yes  Yes 
MNC fixed effects Yes  No 
Unit fixed effects No  Yes 
Observations 45,968  16,719 
Adjusted R
2
 0.232  0.715 
 
Notes. Column (1) shows linear estimates of the maximum span of control for MNC supervisory 
units in a host country, based on data from U.S. multinational manufacturers in 1996–2008. The 
unit of analysis is MNC-country-year. Column (2) shows linear estimates of span of control for 
MNC supervisory units in strong-institution countries. The unit of analysis is MNC supervisory 
unit-year. Standard errors that account for clustering at both the firm and country level appear in 
parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level (two-
tailed tests). 
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Table 4. Supervision, Institutions, and Task Centrality 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 LocalSupervision (1,0) 
       
QualityofInstitutions (H1)  0.747*** 0.626*** 0.625*** 0.636*** 0.288** 
  (0.240) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.154) 
TaskCentrality (1,0)     -0.717 -2.676*** 
     (0.469) (0.960) 
QualityofInstitutions 
xTaskCentrality (H2) 
     1.396** 
      (0.558) 
Subsidiary-
MNC_DifferentBusinesses (1,0) 
   -0.057 -0.188 -0.194 
    (0.261) (0.207) (0.208) 
SubsidiaryProductScope    -0.089 -0.098 -0.099 
    (0.125) (0.120) (0.121) 
SubsidiaryAge    -0.032 -0.026 -0.026 
    (0.092) (0.095) (0.093) 
MNCSize   0.210** 0.210** 0.230** 0.233** 
   (0.100) (0.099) (0.096) (0.097) 
MNCAge   0.092 0.109 0.105 0.104 
   (0.159) (0.155) (0.153) (0.153) 
LocalScale   0.661*** 0.655*** 0.647*** 0.641*** 
   (0.135) (0.137) (0.136) (0.135) 
HostCountryTaxRates -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
HostCountryTelecommunication 0.027*** 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
HostCountryGDP 0.254*** 0.278*** 0.211 0.214 0.217 0.228 
 (0.079) (0.064) (0.189) (0.185) (0.175) (0.179) 
Constant -3.373*** -4.162*** -6.855*** -6.667*** -6.605*** -6.161*** 
 (0.480) (0.426) (1.069) (1.128) (1.122) (1.125) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,901 70,901 70,901 70,901 70,901 70,901 
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.096 0.180 0.180 0.183 0.186 
Log-likelihood -14065 -13966 -12672 -12666 -12619 -12581 
 
Notes. This table shows the logit estimates of the likelihood that a subsidiary is supervised by a 
supervisory unit in the same country versus a foreign country, based on data from U.S. 
multinational manufacturers in 1996–2008. Standard errors that account for clustering at both the 
firm and country level appear in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level (two-
tailed tests). 
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Table 5. Foreign vs. Local Supervision: World Value Survey 
 
  (1) (2) 
  LocalSupervision (1,0) 
 QualityofInstitutions (H1) 2.988* 1.983* 
  (1.562) (1.057) 
 TaskCentrality (1,0) -1.150* -2.062* 
  (0.700) (1.088) 
 QualityofInstitutions xTaskCentrality (H2) 4.045* 4.394** 
  (2.389) (2.014) 
 Constant Yes Yes 
 Subsidiary controls Yes Yes 
 MNC parent controls Yes Yes 
 Country controls Yes No 
 Country dummies No Yes 
 Observations 20,561 19,313 
 Pseudo R2 0.226 0.160 
 Log-likelihood -1578 -3101 
 
Notes. This table shows the logit estimates of the likelihood that a subsidiary is supervised by a 
supervisory unit in the same country versus a foreign country, based on data from U.S. multinational 
manufacturers in 1996–2008. Control variables are the same as those included in Table 4. Standard 
errors that account for clustering at both the firm and country levels appear in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed 
tests). 
 
 
 
